Crowdsourcing is becoming more and more important for commercial purposes. With the growth of crowdsourcing platforms like MTurk, Microworkers or Innocentive, a huge work force and a large knowledge base can be easily accessed and utilized. But due to the anonymity of the workers, they are encouraged to cheat the employers in order to maximize their income. Thus, this paper presents two crowdbased approaches to detect cheating workers. Both approaches are evaluated with regard to their detection quality, their costs and their applicability to different types of typical crowdsourcing tasks.
Introduction
With the rise of the Internet and the tremendous growth of its user base, a huge workforce with a large amount of knowledge developed. This is already exploited in projects like Wikipedia [13] , where users created a high quality encyclopedia by sharing this knowledge, or OpenStreetMap [10] which offers detailed maps from all over the world based on information gathered by its users.
A new approach to use this workforce and the wisdom of the crowd is referred to as crowdsourcing. Crowdsourcing can be viewed as a further development of outsourcing. With outsourcing, entrepreneurs choose specialized subcontractors to accomplish certain parts of a development or production process. In contrast, "crowdsourcing is the act of taking a job traditionally performed by a designated agent (usually an employee) and outsourcing it to an undefined, generally large group of people in the form of an open call" [7] . According to Jeff Howe's definition, the main differences to outsourcing are that the entrepreneur does not know who accomplishes his task and that the workers do not form an organized group like a firm but are members of a large anonymous crowd accessible via crowdsourcing platforms. In traditional work organization, the employer delegates work to the workers, but in the crowdsourcing approach, the worker chooses which tasks he wants to work for.
At the beginning crowdsourcing was often used for non-profit applications. But with the development of platforms like MTurk [4] or Microworkers [12] , which offer an easy access to a huge amount of workers, crowdsourcing became also interesting for commercial usage. The main advantage of commercial crowdsourcing in comparison to the traditional approach is the possibility to get work done very quickly by accessing a large and relatively cheap workforce or to get innovations for "free". However, the work results are not reliable. Some workers try to submit incorrect results in order to maximize their income by completing as many jobs as possible in the least amount of time. Sometimes a small amount of incorrect results can be tolerated, but in general they have to be filtered. This has to be done by the employer or by a trustworthy employee and consumes a lot of time and money compared to the original crowdsourcing jobs. Therefore, techniques have to be developed to detect cheating workers and invalid work results.
In this paper, we present two approaches to detect cheating workers. As the approaches are also based on crowdsourcing, they are easily integrable in common crowdsourcing platforms. Besides a general description of the methodology, we evaluate the quality of our cheat-detection and discuss the costs of the proposed solutions. To depict the applicability of the approaches, we give some use cases for common crowdsourcing tasks and formulate general guidelines how to use our findings for improving the result quality of these tasks.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a quick overview of the concept of crowdsourcing and the research already done in this area. In Section 3 we present our two approaches for work validation, which are evaluated in Section 4. The costs of the approaches are analyzed in Section 5, which also contains relevant examples of use cases. The paper is concluded in Section 6. 
Background and related work
In the following, we give a quick overview of the general ideas and common terms of crowdsourcing. We show typical examples of crowdsourcing tasks and introduce a rough categorization of these tasks, based on the required worker skills.
Crowdsourcing Scheme and Terminology
Applying the crowdsourcing approach, an employer does not selectively choose a worker for a certain task, but offers the task to a large crowd of workers who can freely choose to work on this task or not. In general, there has to be a mediator between the employers and the workers, the so called crowdsourcing platform which is schematically depicted in Figure 1 . Well known examples of these platforms are the aforementioned MTurk and Microworkers.
Employer Worker An employer submits a task to the crowdsourcing platform and defines how much the workers will be paid per task and how the workers have to proof a completed task. Usually the same task has to be done many times. Therefore, multiple copies of the same task are organized as a campaign. Random workers from the crowd choose to work on the task and after completion submit the required poof to the crowdsourcing platform. The work proof is forwarded to the employer, who pays the worker if the task was completed correctly.
Typical Crowdsourcing Tasks and Their Categorization
Crowdsourcing can be used for various purposes which can be roughly categorized into routine tasks, complex tasks, and creative tasks. Routine tasks are jobs which do not require any level of qualification, like bookmarking a web page using social bookmarking services as digg [1] or delicious [14] , clicking on advertisements on web pages, relevance evaluation [3] , or posting a given text into a forum. Complex tasks, like rewriting a given blog or text annotation [8] , need some general skills, in contrast to creative tasks where highly specialized skills are required. Creative tasks include writing an article on a given topic or even research and development [2] .
Usually, detecting cheating workers is more difficult for complex tasks than for routine tasks. Assume a routine task, where a worker has to digg a web page p and leave a comment about p on the digg web page. The worker has to submit his digg user name "Analyzing Costs and Accuracy of Validation Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Platforms."
Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 2012. DOI: 10.1016/j.mcm. 2012 . 01.006 in order to proof that the task is completed. It is easy to automatically check the digg page whether the given user name left a comment on p or not. This is exemplary for routine tasks, where verification is often simple and easy to automatize. For a complex or a creative task the verification of the workers results is more complicated. Assume a complex task, where a worker as to rewrite a given text and a creative task where a worker has to write a text on a given topic. In both cases the worker's texts have to be read and rated according to their content and their writing. This can not be automatized and especially for the complex task the reviewer also needs some background knowledge to judge the relevance of the worker's text.
Related Work
As pointed out, crowdsourcing applications suffer from untrustworthy workers, which try to submit an invalid poof in order to receive a payment without completing the required task. Kittur et al. [9] showed that the quality of some tasks can be increased by adding verification questions in order to detect cheating workers. Also Chen et al. [5] point out that cheating workers are a problem, but they stated that there is no systematic way to cheat their crowdsourcing platform for Quality of Experience tests. However, they do not describe general cheat-detection mechanisms. In [11] , Ahn and Dabbish present a crowd-based image labeling game, which is now used in an adapted version by Google's Image Labeler [6] . In this game a picture is shown simultaneously to two random workers, who suggest labels for the image. If both suggest the same label, it is associated with the picture. Ahn and Dabbish argue that cheating is not possible in this application, because the game is played by a huge number of people and the partners are chosen randomly. Therefore, they are very unlikely to know each other and to collaborate. Currently cheat-detection techniques are either highly specialized, are based on control questions which are evaluated automatically or rely on manual checking by the employer. In the next section, we present two generic crowd-based approaches for tasks where control questions are not applicable and manual re-checking is ineffective. 
Crowd Based Cheat Detection Mechanisms
We propose two different approaches of crowd-based cheat-detection techniques: A majority decision (MD) and an approach using a control group (CG) to re-checking the main task. In order to analyze these approaches we use the model described in the following. The most important variables used for this model, as well as the ones introduced for the evaluation in Section 4 and the cost model in Section 5 are summarized in Table 1 in the Appendix.
General Notion and Variables
In our model, the crowd consists of N individual workers and each worker can only work on one task in a campaign. As mentioned above, not every worker is good-willing and performs the task correctly. However, we can assume that these workers do not intend to falsify the task result but only give a random result in order to complete the task as fast as possible. To account for this, we assume that there is a probability p c that a randomly chosen worker is a cheater, which means the worker will submit a random result. This result is wrong with a probability of p w|c . If a wrong result is detected in a real campaign, it is not possible to decide whether the worker submitted it willingly or accidentally and the worker is treated as a cheater in both cases. Thus, in our model we can assume that only cheaters submit incorrect results, i.e. p w|c = 0. Good-willing users, who accidentally submit an invalid result can be modeled by adjusting p c . Therefore, the probability of a wrong task result is p w = p c · p w|c . To clarify this imagine a multiple choice test with one correct answer out of four possibilities and a crowd of 100 workers including 10 cheaters. The probability of choosing a cheater is p c = 10%, the probability for picking a wrong answer when choosing randomly p w|c = 75%. This results in a probability for a wrong answer p w = 7.5%.
The Majority Decision Approach
A simple approach to eliminate incorrect results is to use a majority decision (MD). This means the same task is given to i different workers and the results are compared. The result which most of the workers submitted is assumed to be correct. Figure 2 depicts the work flow of a campaign using the MD approach. Similar to a normal campaign, the employer submits his task to the crowdsourcing platform (1). However, the task is not only done by one worker, but the crowdsourcing platform duplicates the task several times and offers the same task to a large number of workers (2) . Each of these workers submits his individual task result (3), which might be correct or incorrect. The crowdsourcing platform performs a majority decision to validate the correct result (4) and returns it to the employer (5). In this approach each worker submitting a result is paid.
As an example application of the MD approach, think of an relevance evaluation of an article, where 100 workers have to judge whether the text is related to a certain topic and 95 workers rate it off-topic. Even if there are some cheaters among the workers, the article is with a high probability off-topic. 
The Control Group Approach
Our second approach is based on a control group (CG). A single worker works on a main task and a control group consisting of j other workers re-checks the result, whether it is valid or not. A task is considered to be valid, if the majority of the control group decides the task is correctly done. An important point of this approach is that the main task and the "re-check" task are assumed to have different costs. Usually the main task is expensive, like writing an article to given keywords, while the control task is cheaper.
The work flow of a CG campaign is shown in Figure 3 . The employer submits the main task to the crowdsourcing platform (1) and the task is chosen by a worker (2), who submits the required task result (3). This result is not directly returned to the employer, but the crowdsourcing platform generates a new campaign for validating this result. Therefore, the result of the main task is given to a group of workers, who rate it according to given criteria (4). The ratings of the different workers are returned to the crowdsourcing platform (5), which calculates the final rating of the main task using a majority decision (6). This is necessary, because the workers in the control group may be cheating and submit wrong ratings. If the main task is rated valid, the main worker is paid (7) and the result is returned to the employer (8) .
A possible application of this approach is a task where a worker has to write a long article including some given keywords. This is a quite expensive task, as it is time intensive and the worker has to be creative. As the worker submits the completed article, a new 
Evaluation of the MD and the CG approach
Both approaches use a majority decision of m workers in order to verify the task result. Therefore, we have a closer look on how to choose an optimal m for the majority decision, in order to minimize the costs and maximize the reliability of the decision result. Afterwards, we have a closer look at the quality of the cheat-detection of the MD and the CG approach.
Group Size for Majority Decisions
For a majority decision we use m random workers from the total crowd of N workers. Each of these m workers is with a probability of p c a cheater and submits an invalid result with the probability p w|c . Thus, the number of invalid results X follows a binomial distribution X ∼ BINOM(m, p w ). In order to derive a correct majority decision, the number of incorrect results has to be smaller than m 2 , i.e., the probability of a correct majority decision p m is given by
The total cost of a majority decision increases with the number m of workers involved. Figure 4 depicts the dependency between p m and m for a high probability of an invalid result p w = 0. 4 . The calculated values of p m for odd group sizes are marked with circles, the values for even group sizes with squares.
The probability of a correct majority decision p m is not constantly increasing with the group size, but is dependent on the parity of the group. Smaller groups of an odd number of workers always achieve better results than slightly larger groups of an even number, a mathematical poof is given in the Appendix. Alternatively this effect can be explained by the stalemate when using even groups. While there is always a valid majority decision in odd groups, a stalemate can occur in a majority decision using even groups. In this situation, the majority decision is also assumed to be not correct as the decision process has to be repeated. The exploitation of this effect is helpful in any application of majority decisions, as it helps both to improve the reliability of the results and to lower the costs.
We analyze the possible cost savings in more detail. To this end, we calculate how many workers are needed for the 99% quantile of a correct majority decision (1) in a group with even parity and (2) in a group with odd parity. For both groups the number of workers is dependent on p w . The results are depicted in Figure 5 ; note that the y-axis is in logarithmic scale. The required size of the even group is shown by the dark continuous line, the size of the odd group by the dashed line and the difference of both group sizes by the light continuous line.
From Figure 5 we can conclude two findings. First, we can at least save one worker when using an odd instead of an even group size without reducing the quality of our majority decision. Second, the higher p w is the more workers can be saved using an odd group size. In the remainder of this paper we will only use odd group sizes in majority decisions. 
Quality Comparison of MD and CG Approach
One of the main questions of this work is, whether the MD or the CG approach gives better results in terms of cheat-detection quality. In order to compare both approaches, we use the same number of workers m for the MD approach and for the control group of the CG approach, i.e. i = j = m.
MD Approach
Having a look at the MD approach only two results have to be evaluated, a correct and an incorrect decision. The probability for a correct result using the MD approach p MD is the same as the one given in Equation 1 . Therefore,
Consequently, the probability for an incorrect MD decision p MD is given by
CG Approach
The CG approach is more complicated. Here we have to differentiate as both the main worker and the control crowd may try to cheat. This results in four possible cases. In order to describe these cases, we introduce the following notation: (i) Worker submits a wrong result and the control group decides the result is invalid:
(ii) Worker submits a wrong result and the control group decides the result is valid:
Worker submits a right result and the control group decides the result is valid:
(iv) Worker submits a right result and the control group decides the result is invalid: The probability for a correct decision using the control crowd approach p CG is hence given by
and the probability for a wrong decision using the control crowd approach p CG by
Comparing
, we can see that the both the MD and the CG approach offer the same quality of cheat-detection quality:
However, they differer among there applicability for different crowdsourcing tasks and their costs, as shown in the next section. 
Application of a Cost Model for different Use Cases
Before we give use cases for each of the control approaches, we specify a cost model. As the presented techniques are intended to be used in real crowdsourcing applications, the economic aspect is not negligible and has to be considered carefully.
Cost Model
When using crowdsourcing, workers are usually not paid as they submit a result, but only if the result is valid. Therefore, we define costs only for a successfully completed task. We denote these costs as c 1 . In our CG approach we additionally use a second type of task for the control group. For this task, we assume different costs c 2 ≤ c 1 . Approving an invalid task does not only waste money, but might also have further negative impacts, like encouraging workers to continue cheating in one's campaigns or reputation loss. In order to account for these negative effects, we introduce additional costs c f p for a "false-positive approval", if an invalid task is not detected. Also not paying for correct work has negative influences, as workers tend to stop working for this employer. Hence, we use a penalty c f n for a "false-negative approval", if a correct task is assumed to be invalid. We can now calculate the expected cost for both approaches. We use i = j = m workers for our comparison, thus, the MD and CG approach have the same probability p m to give a correct result. This analysis helps employers to decide, which of the approaches is cheaper for their current use case. But a first, we discuss the cost caused by the manual control by the employer.
Manual Control
If no automatized or crowd-based approach is used, the employer has to recheck the submitted tasks himself. In this case, there are no false-positive approval or false-negative approval, as the employer works correctly and knows all valid results. However, crowdsourcing tasks are generally low payed, whereas the time the employer has to spend on rechecking the task is normally quite expansive. In reality this results in two possible cases. Either a lot of time and money is spend on the controlling of the submitted tasks, or the employer approves all tasks without reviewing them. Both of them are not desirable, as the first case does not use the full cost saving potential of crowdsourcing, and the second case encourages workers to continue cheating and to submit bad quality work.
MD approach
There is no validation of the individual results in the MD approach, hence every worker is paid c 1 and a false-negative approval can not occur. If the majority decision is wrong, the costs are increased by c f p . This results in the total expected costs c MD of this approach,
CG approach
In the CG approach we assume one worker working on the main task, which costs c 1 if successfully completed, and m workers controlling the main task. Each of the m workers (i) Worker submits a wrong result and the control group decides the result is invalid:
(iv) Worker submits a right result and the control group decides the result is invalid:
Therefore, c CG is given by
Using our cost model, we will now have a closer look at typical use cases of crowdsourcing. For this comparison we use five workers for the MD approach and the same amount of workers for the control group of the CG approach, i.e. six in total, to achieve the same probability for a right decision. Afterwards we give guidelines how to optimize the quality-cost ratio of the CG approach.
Routine Task
As mentioned before, routine tasks are a typical use case for crowdsourcing. These tasks are usually low-paid. In this example, we assume the costs per task c 1 = 1, which is the lowest possible payment in our considered crowdsourcing platform. The task of rechecking the main task should not be higher paid, therefore, we pay c 2 = 1 for each control worker. The costs caused by a cheating worker are very low in this case. Usually it does not matter if one of the workers did not fulfill the task, but as he might be encouraged to continue cheating on this kind of task we impose a penalty for each approval of an invalid task of c f p = 1. Refusing to pay a worker who completed his task, will stop him from working for this employer again. But as the crowd contains many worker who can complete this task, the costs c f n are set to c f n = 1. The resulting costs depending on p w are displayed in Figure 6 false positive approval, which becomes more likely as p w increases. The development of the costs of the control crowd is more complex. At p w = 0, the main worker surely earns c 1 = 1 as he is not cheating and the control group earns 5·c 2 = 5, which results in the total costs c CG = 6. With increasing p w , the main worker is more likely to cheat, whereby the expected total costs decrease, as the control group detects this and the worker will not be paid. With p w increasing further, the worker is even more likely to cheat, however p w also influences the quality of the control group. The group makes more wrong decisions with a higher probability leading to increasing costs, as the wrong decisions are penalized by c f p the same way as when using the MD approach. In the case of an unqualified task, the costs for the CG approach are always higher than the costs for the MD approach, since in general c 2 = c 1 and c pf ≈ c 1 . Thus the MD approach should be preferred for routine tasks.
Complex and Creative Task
In complex and creative tasks wrong results usually have a large impact on the employer. One example for that kind of task is an advertisement campaign in forums. An employer wants to promote a product in web forums which deal with topics related to the product. But as direct advertisement is not desired in forum posts, the advertisement has to be hidden in a normal post using a recommendation which fits in the context of a forum thread. The worker has to find an appropriate forum thread and write an individual text, therefore, we assume c 1 = 5 in this case. As proof the worker has to give a link to the thread where he posted the advertisement. The control group only has to check the given thread, whether the post is related to the topic and includes the desired recommendation. Hence, we assume a payment c 2 = 1 for each member of the control group. In order to study the influence of c 2 we also calculate the costs for c 1 = c 2 = 5. If the hidden advertisement campaign is recognized by the forum administrators, they are very likely to delete the post or a negative discussion about the employer will arise. Therefore, the penalty for approving wrong posts is set very high to c f p = 20. Besides this, qualified workers for the main task are rather rare and losing one of them because of a not paid work is not desirable. Because of this, we set the penalty for not approving a correct task to c f n = 5. The resulting costs are depicted in Figure 7 in the same manner as in Figure 6 . The costs curves of the MD and the CG approach show a similar shape than for the unqualified task. However, in this case the CG approach with c 1 = 5 and c 2 = 1 is always cheaper than the MD approach, because of the high penalty for false positive approvals and the low costs for the control task c 2 < c 1 . If the costs for the control task are raised c 2 = c 1 = 5, the CG approach performs better than MD for p w ∈ [0.20, 0.58] and otherwise MD outperforms CG.
We can derive two guidelines for complex and creative tasks. If cost ratio 1, which is the case for most complex and creative tasks, the CG approach should be favored. Otherwise the cost optimal cheat-detection mechanism for a given p w can be found applying our cost model.
Cost-Quality Optimization Guidelines for Complex and Creative Tasks
A cost-quality optimization for complex and creative tasks is important as they are expensive compared to routine tasks. For this kind of task, the CG approach outperforms the MD approach in terms of costs in most cases. Hence, we will focus on the CG approach in the following.
Optimizing Overall Costs and Cheat-Detection Quality
In order to reduce the total costs c CG , a smaller control crowd can be used. However, this negatively affects the quality of the cheat-detection, as the probability of a correct CG result p CG decreases with the group size, see Figure 4 . Though, in many cases a trade-off between c CG and p CG has to be made. For our evaluation we use the example mentioned above with c 1 = 5, c 2 = 1, c f p = 20 and c f n = 5. Figure 8 shows that c CG increases with p w and p CG . More workers are needed for a better cheat-detection quality c CG leading to higher costs. Also with an increase of p w more workers are required to achieve a valid result. For a small value of p w the influence of p CG on the costs is only marginal and increasing the cheat-detection quality e.g. from 90% to 99% does not affect the costs very much. But for high values of p w the costs increase tremendously with p CG , which makes an detection improvement from 90% to 99% extremely expensive.
We can assume that an employer can approximately determine p w based on the results of previous campaigns. Therefore, this model allows him make a trade-off between costs and result quality according to his needs. 
Maximizing Available Salary for the Main Task
Creative and complex tasks require special skills. In order to attract skilled workers, these tasks have to be better paid than routine tasks. But the costs c CG for a task using the CG approach are split between the skilled main task worker and the control group workers responsible for the cheat-detection quality. Therefore, we have to make a tradeoff between the available money for the main worker and the cheat-detection quality.
By setting c 1 = 0 and assuming fixed values for c 2 = 1, c f p = 10, c f n = 5 and p w = 0.3, we can use Equation 8 to calculate the overhead costs c CG overhead dependent on the desired probability of a correct result p CG . For a fixed budget c CG , the maximal available salary c 1 can now be calculated by,
In the ideal case c 1 = c CG , which means there are no other costs than the costs for the main task, but in reality c 1 < c CG . Hence, we introduce the quotient c 1 c CG as a measure for the efficiency of the cost distribution. The smaller the value the more budget is spend on the control group, the higher the value the more salary is available for the main task. The intersection of the curves and the x-axis mark the minimum required task budget for the given p CG . At this intersection point, no salary for the main task is available. With increasing budget c CG , more salary for the main task is available as c CG overhead remains constant. For large budgets, the main task salary is the biggest part of the total costs. The intersections of the curves and the x-axis move to the right for higher p CG , which shows that the higher the desired quality the more expensive the task. With higher p CG also the efficiency of the cost distribution degrades quickly and disproportionate amount of the budget is spent on the control crowd instead of the main worker. Therefore, an employer has to consider carefully if a p CG of 99% is realy needed instead of a p CG of 95% or 90%. 
Conclusion
Crowdsourcing has only recently developed, but due to its various applications it is becoming an important new form of work organization. One of the major problems are untrustworthy workers trying to maximize their income by submitting as many tasks as possible even if they did not complete the task.
As manual re-checking of each task is not desirable, we proposed two different crowdbased methods, the MD and the CG approach, to verify task results. We have shown that, using the same amount of workers, both approaches offer the same significance level for detecting cheating workers. Furthermore, we have proven that it is generally better to use an odd group size instead of an even group size for the presented approaches. Using this finding helps to improve the quality and to reduce the costs of majority decisions.
All these results were used to derive a cost model for of our approaches. The costs of the MD and the CG approach were analyzed using typical types of crowdsourcing tasks. This analysis revealed that the MD approach is more suitable for low paid routine tasks, whereas the CG approach performs better for high prized tasks. In order to minimize the costs of high prized tasks, the CG approach was investigated in more detail. We showed that a slight reduce of the cheat-detection quality can significantly lower the cost for the whole task. Similarly, the overhead costs of the CG approach can be significantly decreased by slightly decreasing the cheat-detection quality.
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Costs if the main worker submits a wrong result and the control group decides the result is invalid c wd
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Costs if the main worker submits a right result and the control group decides the result is invalid c CG Expected total costs if using the CG approach Assume an even number 2n, n ∈ N of workers for the majority decision. The maximal number of incorrect results, which still leads to a correct majority decision is 2n/2 − 1 = n − 1. Therefore, the probability for a correct majority decision of an even group is P e (X ≤ n − 1) =
Assuming an odd number 2n−1, n ∈ N of workers for the majority decision, the maximal number of incorrect results still leading to a correct majority decision is (2n − 1)/2 = n − 1/2 = n−1. Hence, the probability for a correct majority decision of an even group is
In order to poof, that a small odd group size give better results than a slightly larger even group size, we show (10) > (9) for n ≥ 2. If n = 0 or n = 1, a majority decision is not possible.
Proof using induction: Basis:n = 2 The probability for a correct majority decision using an even number of 4 workers is P e (X ≤ n − 1) = P e (X ≤ 1) The probability for a correct majority decision using an odd number of 3 workers is
The difference between P o (X ≤ 1) and P e (X ≤ 1) is P o (X ≤ 1) − P e (X ≤ 1) = (2 · p w 3 − 3 · p w 2 + 1) 
